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Abstract
We examine whether contagion tests are a¤ected by controls for volatility
clustering and the collection of synchronized data sets. Without controlling for
volatility clustering synchronization does not apparently matter. Once volatility
clustering is accounted for synchronized data dramatically changes results.
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1 Introduction
Contagion between asset markets during nancial crises is dened as the transmission
of shocks via newly opened channels associated with crisis events. Many existing conta-
gion tests rely in some form on detecting changes in correlation between asset returns
when markets enter a crisis period, as surveyed in Dungey et al (2005). Contagion
e¤ects may be evidenced as increased correlation, such as in the theoretical models
of Kodres and Pritsker (2002), or as lower correlation consistent with breaking link-
ages between nancial institutions as proposed in network theory; see Allen and Babus
(2008).
Detecting contagion e¤ects relies upon two important determinants. The rst is
controlling for changes in volatility in common e¤ects. Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
suggest a correlation coe¢ cient based test which adjusts for the increase in general
market volatility during crisis periods. Without this adjustment unconditional corre-
lation tests will be biased towards the detection of contagion e¤ects. However, this
test does not control for the well-known volatility clustering of nancial market data.
This paper considers whether controlling for volatility clustering results in di¤erent
outcomes for tests of transmission between countries during times of nancial crisis by
comparing the results of the Forbes and Rigobon test with those of the Hong (2001)
volatility spillover test.
The second potentially important determinant of contagion outcomes is in the tim-
ing of the collected data. E¢ cient market theories support that markets reect news
simultaneously, so that tests which compare data separated in time are likely to con-
tain bias, as demonstrated by Martens and Poon (2001) for correlation coe¢ cients.
In contagion studies it is common to compare data from di¤erent time zones: Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) use a two day moving average and Dungey et al (2005) lag North
American markets by one day when comparing with Asian markets. Kleimeier, Lehnert
and Verschoor (2008) address this issue using the Forbes and Rigobon test and nd
that although the calculated coe¢ cients change, the result of no contagion between
most markets was retained.
This paper examines the evidence for contagion from the US to European equity
markets during the global nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Forbes and Rigobon and Hong
tests are applied to a non-synchronized dataset on closing market prices, and a syn-
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chronized dataset of 16:00GMT market prices. The results strongly indicate the im-
portance of controlling for both volatility clustering and timing of the data. Changing
from non-synchronized to synchronized data does not greatly a¤ect the conclusions
of the Forbes and Rigobon test, while the Hong test nds more contagion than the
Forbes and Rigobon test in both cases. In the non-synchronized dataset the Hong test
regularly produces evidence of signicant transmissions, while with synchronized data
there is very little signicant evidence for transmission.
1.1 The tests
The Forbes and Rigobon test is applied to returns on two assets, fr1;t ; r2;t g which
have been ltered via a VAR(1). Under the null hypothesis of no contagion, the
correlation coe¢ cients of these returns from the VAR(1) do not change between a
crisis and noncrisis period, that is H0 = pnc = vc where pnc is the non-crisis period
correlation coe¢ cient and vc represents the crisis period correlation coe¢ cient adjusted
for heteroskedasticity
vc =
p^cq
1 + ( s
2
c s2nc
s2nc
)(1  p^c)2
(1)
where pc is the crisis sample correlation coe¢ cient, and s2 denotes the appropriate
sample variances. Under the null hypothesis of no contagion the Forbes and Rigobon
statistic is
FR =
1
2
ln

1+v^c
1 v^c

  1
2
ln

p^nc
1 p^nc

q
1
Tc 3 +
1
Tnc 3
~N(0; 1) (2)
where Tc and Tnc are the number of observations in the crisis and non-crisis periods
respectively.
The Hong (2001) test is an extension of the Cheung and Ng (1996) test for causality
in variance, based on cross correlations of conditional variances obtained from univari-
ate GARCH processes. It involves lagged mean e¤ects from other markets, and can be
viewed as being parallel to the Forbes and Rigobon test while controlling for volatility
clustering. An advantage of the Hong test is that it does not rely on a priori exogeneity
assumptions, as required in the Forbes and Rigobon test, but determines the direction
of transmission.
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The test procedure involves estimating univariate GARCH(p,q) models including
one-lagged returns from other markets and testing the correlations between the result-
ing standardized conditional variances. Dening ri;t as the return series of interest,
with rj;t as the other market under consideration
ri;t= 0 + 1Dt + 2ri;t 1+3Dri;t 1+4rj;t 1+5Drj;t 1+zt (3)
hi;t= 0 +
pX
s=1
sht s +
qX
s=1
s"
2
t s
where "i;t  idd(0, ht); and Dt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the ex-
ogenously dened crisis period and 0 otherwise. Let , Iit, i = 1; 2 be the information set
dened as Iit = fRij; j  0g, It = I1t[I2t so that E("it jIit 1) = 0 and E("2it jIit 1) = 1:
The Hong (2001) null hypothesis for no causality in time varying conditional variances
can be written as:
H0 : Var(z1t jI1t 1) = Var(z1t jIt 1)
The one-sided test statistic proposed by Hong is given as:
Q =
fTPw2(k=M)p2uv(k)  c(w)g
(2D(w))1=2
~N(0; 1) (4)
C(w) :
T 1X
k=1
(1  k=T )w2(k=M)
D(w) :
T 1X
k=1
(1  k=T )[1  (j + 1)=T ]w4(k=M)
where ^t = z^
2
1t=h^1t and ^t = z^
2
2t=h^2t are the centered squared standardized residuals
from the GARCH (p,q) estimates on a sample size of T, with a sample cross-correlation
at lag k, given by
puv(k) =
cuv(k)q
T   2PTt=1 ^2tPTt=1 ^2t (5)
with sample covariances
cuv(k) = T
 1
T 1X
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and
cuv(k) = T
 1
T 1X
k=1+1
^t^t+k; k < 0:
The function w(.) is a weighting function for which we explored the use of the Bartlett,
Daniell and Truncated kernels, and M is the number of cross correlations included.
2 Data
The data consist of stock market returns for the UK FTSE100, the US S&P500 and
seven European indices for local closing times (the CP dataset) and for 16:00 GMT
times (the 4pm dataset). The European indices considered are for the markets located
in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland a well as the EU wide
index. Compound daily returns are calculated as log di¤erences of the stock prices1.
The sample begins on July 29, 2004, consistent with the previous tightening cycle
in the monetary policy cycle in the US, and ends on March 20, 2009. To implement the
tests the period is divided into non-crisis and crisis samples, delineated by the start of
the crisis period on July 17, 2009. This date corresponds to the announcement by Bear
Stearns of the collapse of two hedge funds, and was shortly after followed by suspension
of payments by BNP Paribas and increased support facilities by the ECB and Fed in
early August 2009.
Some descriptive statistics of the data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. For both CP
and 4pm data, the standard deviations of equity market returns for all countries increase
between the stable and crisis periods, while mean returns decrease for all countries.
The extreme minima and maxima for all countries arise during the crisis period. All
markets experience negative daily average returns during the crisis period.
Tables 3 and 4 provide the covariance structure for the nine countries equity returns
during the pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively. It is clear that both variance and
covariance between equity returns raises in crises period for both 4pm and CP data. For
example the variance of returns in Austria which is the most dramatic one rises from
nearly 1.06% in the pre crisis period to over 6.79% during the crisis period for CP data.
1The Datastream codes for the indices at 4pm (Closing prices) are: Austria: AME0E16
(AMSTEOE), EU: DJES516 (DJES50I), France: CAC4016 (FRCAC40), Germany: DAXIN16
(DAXINDX), Italy: ITM3016 (ITMIB30), Netherlands: AME0E16 (AMSTEOE), Swiss: SWIMK16
(SWISSMI), UK: FTSE100 (FTSE100), US: SPCMP16 (S&PCOMP). Daily returns in all series are
found to be stationary.
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Netherlands, US, France, EU, UK, Italy, Germany and Switzerland follow Austria with
variances of under 1% in pre-crisis period to in some cases over 5% in the post-crisis
period. Similar patterns are mirrored in the 4pm where the Austrian variance rises from
nearly 0.99% in the pre-crisis period to over 6.09% during the crisis. Other countries
experience below 1% variance in the pre-crisis period and mainly more than 4% in the
crisis period.
The covariances between equity returns also rises from the pre-crisis to crisis periods
in both data sets. For the pre-crisis period all covariances are less than 1%, but in the
crisis period rise to as large as 4.77% between France and the Netherlands for the
CP data, and 4.21% between Austria and the Netherlands for the 4pm data, while the
smallest covariance is 2.21% between the US and Switzerland in the CP data.
3 Empirical Findings
This section presents the ndings of the di¤erent contagion tests, building the case
for including both synchronization and appropriate control for heteroskedasticity in
determining whether contagion is present in any crisis situation. Table 5 presents the
p-values for Forbes and Rigobon test results for the test of no contagion from the US
to the other markets using the CP and 4pm data sets, and test results for applying the
test to transmissions from the UK to other countries in the data set. The tests nd
no evidence of signicant contagion from either the US or the UK to other countries
in either data set.2
The p-values for the one sided test results from the Hong tests on standardized
residuals from univariate GARCH models are reported in Tables 6 and Table 7. The
univariate GARCH results for each asset were selected using AIC criteria and are
largely GARCH(1,1). The individual results are not presented in order to preserve
space. In applying the Hong test we consider three alternative kernels: the Bartlett,
Daniell, and Truncated kernels and three alternative values of M , the extent of cross
correlation, here M =5, 10, and 15 for each T . For brevity we report the results for
the Daniell kernel and M = 10 in detail, as these typify the test results. Full results
2Note that we largely solve the endogeneity problem inherent in these pairwise tests by denoting
the US and the UK as source countries for the potentially contagious shocks. However, Table 5 does
include a result for both US to UK and UK to US based tests, which strictly speaking violate the
exogeneity assumption required for these tests. They are advanced here as illustration.
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are available on request.
Table 6 presents the results for the null hypothesis of no causality in variance from
the US to the European countries, for both the CP and 4pm data. During the non-crisis
period there is no evidence of rejection of this hypothesis. The second part of the table
presents the results for the null hypothesis of no causality from European countries to
the US, and again there is no evidence of rejection of that hypothesis in the non-crisis
period.
During the crisis period the non-synchronized data strongly reject the hypothesis
of no causality from the US to Europe, but not from the European countries to the
US. This is consistent with contagion e¤ects from the US to Europe. However, when
the synchronized 4pm data set are used, there is no evidence of signicant rejections
of the null of no causality in either direction. The use of synchronised data changes
the results in an economically meaningful way - when using non-synchronized data
contagion e¤ects are evident in the test results, which are simply overcome by using
synchronized data which draw on the same information set.
Table 7 presents the results of the tests for causality in variance between the UK and
the other sample countries. In both the crisis and non-crisis periods the no causality
hypothesis is accepted from European countries to the UK. However, the hypothesis
of no causality from the UK to a number of European countries is rejected in the non-
crisis period at 10 percent signicance, particularly with the CP data set, but only with
France and Italy with the 4pm data set. In the crisis period, the null of no causality
is rejected for all but Austria, the Netherlands and Switzerland with both the CP and
4pm data.
4 Conclusions
This paper has shown how important controlling for volatility changes, in particular
volatility clustering, and synchronization of data sets can be for testing for the exis-
tence of crisis transmission e¤ects, that is contagion. The straight forward Forbes and
Rigobon test suggests the absence of transmission between all markets in the study,
regardless of the synchronicity of the datasets. However, when volatility clustering is
accounted for the Hong test suggests signicant transmissions between markets, par-
ticularly if the data are asynchronous. The results suggest that the less asynchronous
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data sets between the UK and Europe are less a¤ected than where the time di¤erence
is greater, as between the US and Europe. When synchronicity was accounted for the
ndings of signicant causality from the US to Europe, consistent with contagion ef-
fects, are overruled. This suggests that empirical work needs to be particularly careful
with synchronicity issues in testing for contagion, as once data characteristics such as
clustering are accounted for, lack of syncrhonicity in data may drive empirical results.
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Table 1:
Descriptive statistics of daily percentage equity returns for selected periods: Pre-crisis period (29th July 2004 to 16th July
2007), Crisis period (17th July 2007 to 20th March 2009), Total period (29th July 2004 to 20th March 2009).
Country Sample period Mean SDev Mak Min Skewness Kurtosis
CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm
AUSTRIA Pre-crisis period 0.115 0.115 1.030 0.997 4.672 3.735 -7.768 -7.000 -1.172 -1.195 10.470 9.160
Crisis period -0.252 -0.257 2.610 2.472 12.021 10.815 -10.253 -9.447 0.023 -0.193 6.180 5.919
Total period -0.018 -0.020 1.782 1.696 12.021 10.815 -10.253 -9.447 -0.378 0.641 11.072 10.514
EU Pre-crisis period 0.067 0.067 0.804 0.765 2.643 2.362 -3.413 -2.793 -0.304 -0.324 4.333 4.028
Crisis period -0.182 -0.183 2.141 2.055 10.438 8.895 -8.208 -8.042 0.206 -0.002 7.382 6.962
Total period -0.023 -0.024 1.444 1.384 10.438 8.895 -8.208 -8.042 -0.016 -0.276 13.105 12.521
FRANCE Pre-crisis period 0.067 0.067 0.808 0.779 2.505 2.453 -3.227 -3.091 -0.327 -0.362 4.255 3.944
Crisis period -0.179 -0.180 2.197 2.104 10.595 9.610 -9.472 -8.386 0.305 0.145 7.601 6.939
Total period -0.022 -0.022 1.475 1.415 10.595 9.610 -9.472 -8.386 0.107 -0.098 13.643 12.459
GERMANY Pre-crisis period 0.095 0.095 0.870 0.849 2.605 2.547 -3.463 -2.840 -0.363 -0.333 4.047 3.832
Crisis period -0.157 -0.158 2.059 2.071 10.797 10.132 -7.433 -7.967 0.459 0.071 8.993 7.417
Total period 0.004 0.003 1.425 1.424 10.797 10.132 -7.433 -7.967 0.238 -0.183 14.339 12.329
ITALY Pre-crisis period 0.057 0.057 0.718 0.675 2.354 1.907 -3.790 -3.263 -0.664 -0.712 5.361 5.002
Crisis period -0.227 -0.227 2.075 1.973 10.765 8.317 -8.817 -9.297 0.323 -0.034 8.205 6.819
Total period 0.045 -0.046 1.381 1.311 10.765 8.317 -8.917 -9.297 0.055 -0.405 15.263 12.979
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Table 2:
Descriptive statistics of daily percentage equity returns for selected periods: Pre-crisis period (29th July 2004 to 16th July
2007), Crisis period (17th July 2007 to 20th March 2009), Total period (29th July 2004 to 20th March 2009).
Country Sample period Mean SDev Mak Min Skewness Kurtosis
CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm
NETH. Pre-crisis period 0.069 0.069 0.758 0.730 2.570 2.486 -3.293 -2.967 -0.368 -0.356 4.752 4.270
Crisis period -0.221 -0.222 2.287 2.122 10.028 8.917 -9.590 -8.879 0.051 -0.125 7.541 6.536
Total period -0.036 -0.037 1.510 1.411 10.028 8.917 -9.590 -8.879 -0.237 -0.472 14.597 12.461
SWETZ. Pre-crisis period 0.067 0.067 0.713 0.683 2.614 2.244 -3.455 -3.536 -0.481 -0.452 5.010 4.859
Crisis period -0.151 -0.151 1.879 1.872 10.788 7.759 -8.108 -7.386 0.320 0.134 7.349 5.483
Total period -0.012 -0.012 1.270 1.256 10.788 7.759 -8.108 -7.386 0.098 -0.118 12.930 10.040
UK Pre-crisis period 0.054 0.054 0.666 0.666 2.604 2.604 -2.963 -2.963 -0.381 -0.381 4.922 4.922
Crisis period -0.127 -0.127 2.061 2.061 9.384 9.384 -9.266 -9.266 0.055 0.055 6.890 6.890
Total period -0.012 -0.012 1.352 1.352 9.384 9.384 -9.266 -9.266 -0.151 -0.151 13.644 13.644
US Pre-crisis period 0.044 0.045 0.649 0.596 2.134 2.005 -3.534 -2.208 -0.249 -0.091 4.553 3.712
Crisis period -0.160 -0.157 2.247 2.101 10.957 10.945 -9.470 -10.136 -0.069 0.241 7.336 9.463
Total period 0.030 -0.028 1.451 1.354 10.957 10.945 -9.470 -10.136 -0.321 0.092 15.440 19.830
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Table 3:
Covariance of daily percentage equity returns for Pre-Crisis period (29th July 2004 to 16th July 2007)
Country AUSTRIA EU FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETH. SWITH. UK US
4pm CP
1.060 0.504 0.512 0.528 0.458 0.470 0.434 0.434 0.186 AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA 0.993 0.645 0.633 0.645 0.520 0.572 0.468 0.468 0.245 EU
EU 0.461 0.585 0.652 0.657 0.509 0.562 0.470 0.470 0.237 FRANCE
FRANCE 0.476 0.579 0.606 0.755 0.541 0.597 0.486 0.486 0.262 GERMANY
GERMANY 0.496 0.626 0.616 0.721 0.515 0.460 0.397 0.397 0.209 ITALY
ITALY 0.423 0.461 0.456 0.491 0.455 0.573 0.429 0.429 0.218 NETH.
NETH. 0.439 0.522 0.519 0.559 0.413 0.533 0.379 0.379 0.174 SWITH.
SWITH. 0.393 0.428 0.434 0.460 0.343 0.399 0.466 0.443 0.190 UK
UK 0.402 0.415 0.421 0.445 0.351 0.385 0.339 0.443 0.420 US
US 0.318 0.364 0.359 0.394 0.287 0.331 0.284 0.275 0.355
Table 4:
Covariance of daily percentage equity returns for Crisis period (17th July 2007 to 20th March 2009)
Country AUSTRIA EU FRANCE GERMANY ITALY NETH. SWITH. UK US
4pm CP
6.798 4.423 4.576 4.101 4.180 4.744 3.699 4.195 2.509 AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA 6.097 4.571 4.610 4.195 4.188 4.612 3.566 4.138 2.778 EU
EU 4.012 4.212 4.814 4.114 4.284 4.775 3.671 4.282 2.736 FRANCE
FRANCE 4.201 4.177 4.417 4.229 3.658 4.111 3.178 3.725 2.831 GERMANY
GERMANY 3.899 4.014 3.969 4.281 4.297 4.320 3.353 3.853 2.342 ITALY
ITALY 3.857 3.747 3.844 3.556 3.884 5.220 3.667 4.390 2.917 NETH.
NETH. 4.212 4.052 4.171 3.885 3.756 4.494 3.521 3.426 2.215 SWITH.
SWITH. 3.532 3.401 3.497 3.289 3.098 3.397 3.496 4.240 2.478 UK
UK 3.973 3.753 3.874 3.668 3.432 3.894 3.312 4.240 5.036 US
US 3.748 3.790 3.898 3.588 3.531 3.774 3.274 3.562 4.402
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Table 5:
Results of Forbes and Rigobon test (p-values):Pre-crisis period (29th July 2004 to 16th July 2007), Crisis period (17th July
2007 to 20th March 2009), Total period (29th July 2004 to 20th March 2009).
Contagion to Contagion from
US UK
CP 4pm CP 4pm
AUSTRIA -0.325 0.731 -1.564 -1.676
(0.627) (0.767) (0.941) (0.953)
EU -1.625 -2.530 -2.628 -2.517
(0.948) (0.994) (0.996) (0.994)
FRANCE 0.050 -0.449 -0.987 -1.049
(0.480) (0.673) (0.838) (0.853)
GERMAN -0.200 0.387 0.792 0.185
(0.579) (0.349) (0.214) (0.427)
ITALY -0.184 -0.778 -1.323 -1.189
(0.573) (0.767) (0.907) (0.883)
NETH. -0.583 -0.778 -1.218 -1.306
(0.720) (0.782) (0.888) (0.904)
SWITH. -0.229 -0.978 -1.403 -1.536
(0.618) (0.835) (0.920) (0.938)
UK -0.766 -1.288 - -
(0.778) (0.901) - -
US - - -0.713 -1.254
- - (0.762) (0.895)
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Table 6:
Results of Hong test for US (p-values)
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period
Country US9 Rit Rit 9 US US9 Rit Rit 9 US
CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm
AUSTRIA 0.787 0.864 0.911 0.849 0.000 0.871 0.656 0.737
EU 0.808 0.797 0.936 0.756 0.000 0.872 0.842 0.620
FRANCE 0.916 0.886 0.934 0.670 0.000 0.849 0.799 0.670
GERMANY 0.939 0.575 0.915 0.519 0.000 0.890 0.893 0.309
ITALY 0.927 0.906 0.277 0.391 0.000 0.812 0.708 0.708
NETH. 0.178 0.811 0.924 0.853 0.000 0.760 0.776 0.077
SWITH. 0.867 0.866 0.214 0.452 0.000 0.673 0.413 0.537
UK 0.629 0.814 0.147 0.659 0.000 0.798 0.712 0.842
Table 7:
Results of Hong test for UK (p-values)
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period
Country UK 9 Rit Rit 9 UK UK 9 Rit Rit 9 UK
CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm CP 4pm
AUSTRIA 0.098 0.457 0.872 0.775 0.584 0.686 0.600 0.920
EU 0.084 0.168 0.780 0.864 0.001 0.000 0.762 0.891
FRANCE 0.200 0.000 0.844 0.827 0.014 0.000 0.575 0.944
GERMANY 0.105 0.485 0.469 0.821 0.049 0.020 0.888 0.916
ITALY 0.131 0.098 0.128 0.123 0.020 0.090 0.488 0.847
NETH. 0.040 0.174 0.591 0.744 0.296 0.469 0.421 0.854
SWITH. 0.087 0.237 0.860 0.807 0.791 0.365 0.773 0.794
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